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ABSTRACT
This paper considers a dynamic model of Tiebout-like migration between communities
that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods. At issue is whether voluntary
or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time. We model in¯nitely lived
individuals who make repeated, sequential location decisions over one of two communities.
Each community uses a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods. The ¯rst is one in
which contributions are given voluntarily by the citizenry of the community. The second is
a compulsory scheme by which individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax
determined by a majority vote. Opportunities to accumulate wealth exist via accumulation
of public capital.
The Markov Perfect equilibria of the dynamic game are studied. Our main result shows
that when accumulated wealth converges to a steady state, individuals' locational choices
eventually \select" the involuntary provision mechanism. This holds despite the fact that
unanimous location in the voluntary provision community may in many cases remain as a
Nash equilibrium of the static game each period. We also describe conditions under which
voluntary provision survives. These conditions require that accumulation of capital fails to
decrease wealth dispersion over time. The results are shown to be consistent with ¯ndings
relating inequality to school choice.
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There are two major problems associated with public goods provision. One is the standard
free rider problem. This problem exists when provision is voluntary rather than coercive.
Since individual incentives lead typically to underprovision of the good, individuals may
prefer to submit to some degree of centralized coercive provision. A common way to accom-
plish this is through involuntary taxation which is decided by some voting rule. However,
this leads to a second potential problem. Even if free riding is be overcome, heterogeneous
individuals will by no means agree on the appropriate output and contributions. Hence,
there is a problem of con°icting interests. Individuals in di®erent income groups may have
widely varying preferences on the appropriate tax rate. An individual may be compelled to
contribute at, what is for him, a highly undesirable tax rate.
Given these problems, the tradeo® between voluntary provision and coercive/involuntary
provision is clear. Involuntary provision may overcome free riding, but creates potential
con°icts in choosing tax rates. By contrast, voluntary provision does not compel anyone to
contribute, but it cannot prevent free riding. In either case, if an individual does nor like
the current provision level and contribution, he can \vote with his feet" by choosing to move
elsewhere. This paper is concerned with how migration or \voting with one's feet" a®ects
the viability of these two mechanisms.
1 Since the in°uential paper of Tiebout (1956), models of local public goods entail that
individuals migrate to determine the types and spatial distributions of local public tax and
expenditure policies o®ered in society. It is often assumed that each community has a local
\social planner" that responds optimally to migratory pressures given the policies o®ered
by other communities. Moreover, institutions for provision of public goods are modelled as
being homogeneous across communities and clubs. However, this is not necessarily or even
typically the case. In the U.S., most small communities and suburbs have a voluntary ¯re
department; at the same time, in larger cities ¯re protection is funded from the tax base.
Public schools rely on property or income taxes, while private school tuition is subsidized by
charitable donations. Some churches rely on member donations while others impose income
tax (i.e., means-tested membership fees) on the membership.
The magnitudes of funding from these di®erent provision institutions are large. Volun-
1See also, for example, Greenberg (1983), Wooders (1978, 1988, 1989), and Scotchmer and Wooders
(1987).
1tary money donations in the U.S. measured 96 billion dollars in 1989 with approximately
the same amount constituting the value of donated time. The total measures almost 2% of
2 GDP. These contributions go to fund public monuments, political parties, homeless shelters,
after-school programs for children, free medical clinics, art institutes, community orchestras,
neighborhood crime-watch organizations, and day care and pre-schools programs. By con-
3 trast, state and local purchases (excluding transfers) constitutes approximately 12% of GDP.
For purposes of comparison, in the consolidated government in the US, defense and other
4 purchases are 52% of the entire budget. Since government's share of GDP is about 35%,
purchases of goods and services constitute 18.5% of GDP. We take this number as an upper
bound on the amount of public goods provided by compulsory means. Notice that while
involuntary provision of public goods is larger than voluntary provision, voluntary provision
constitutes a sizeable fraction of GDP.
Evidence that di®erentiation in provision matters in mobility decisions can be found
in White (1980) and Clark (1986). According to Clark: \The public good component is
especially important in choosing a destination city among several alternatives in the same
5 region" (italics ours). From examining patterns of residential migration as part of the
U.S. Census, White (1980) observed: \The early 20th century model of the metropolis in
which political, economic, and residential systems were coextensive has been largely replaced
by a `vote with your feet' residential system where the choice of neighborhood of residence
not only implies a certain composition of the housing stock and social composition of the
neighbors, but also participation in a di®erentiated political structure." (p. 263. Italics ours)
This paper therefore introduces a theory of spatial migration between communities which
are distinguished by the political structures they use to provide these goods. We are less
interested in what these mechanisms do for migration than what migration does for the
mechanisms. The question we address is: what kinds of provision mechanisms stand up
to migratory forces? Are voluntary or involuntary procedures likely to prevail over time?
In other words, we want a theory which can explain the relative sizes of voluntary and
involuntary contributions to public goods within an economy. Finally, what is the role of
dynamic forces such as capital accumulation in the \selection" process?
To simplify the analysis we examine migration between two communities, each endowed
2See Schi® (1990).
3See Barro (1993).
4See Auerbach and Kotliko® (1995).
5p.67. Clark notes that, generally, detailed survey data on mobility decisions are scarce.
2with a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods. In the ¯rst, contributions toward a
local public good are given voluntarily by the citizenry or membership of the community. In
the second, individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax determined by the
majority voting. Individuals di®er only by having di®erent wealth endowments. We allow
for the possibility that congestion within a community diminishes the public good. Section
2 ¯rst introduces the spatial model.
A companion paper (Glomm and Laguno® (1997)) characterizes equilibria of the static
version of this dual location scenario. There it is shown that multiple equilibria typically
6 exist, each supporting one or the other provision mechanism. A primary reason for the
multiplicity is that the static model cannot preclude simple coordination problems. For
example, a person will not move from a large community to a small one even if the smaller
community is more closely aligned with the individual's preferences. Even if the small
community solves, say, the free rider problem with desireable tax rates, its aggregate wealth
is too low to o®er an attraction. This is due to the nonrivalrousness of the good.
To address this problem, the present paper examines an intertemporal model of migra-
tion. This model is introduced in Section 3. Individuals repeatedly make sequential location
decisions over communities. Opportunities to accumulate wealth exist through accumulation
of public capital which is also consumed. Human capital or infrastructure are examples that
have this feature. We examine Markov Perfect equilibria of the dynamic game. Which mech-
anisms survive depend on the degree of con°ict of interests generated by the accumulation
process over time. Our main result shows that if congestion e®ects are not too strong, and
if capital accumulation in a community converges to a steady state level, then involuntary
provision survives uniquely. This means that all individuals in society eventually move to
the community with involuntary provision and remain there permanently.
The mechanics of the model show how societies without large inequities in income could
agglomerate eventually to communities with involuntary rather than voluntary procedures.
We also provide examples in which the opposite is true if the accumulation process does not
converge. Namely, when the accumulation technology admits su±cient income dispersion,
then voluntary provision may be better suited to those whose preferences di®er widely from
that of the median voter. In Section 4 we relate these results to some recent ¯ndings on
wealth distribution and private versus public school choice. While private schooling also
has a strong private component, the local externality generated by one's education generates
6Strati¯ed equilibria between the two mechanisms also exist under certain conditions but were shown to
be comparatively rare.
3potential free frider problems similar to other voluntary mechanisms. The results are roughly
consistent with these ¯ndings, bearing in mind the imperfect link between schooling choices
and choices between mechanisms examined in the model.
Of course, the actual mechanics are meant to be more illustrative than predictive. To
understand why these mechanics work and how the multiplicity issue is resolved, recall the
tradeo® between the two mechanisms. Free riding occurs in the voluntary community; con-
°icting interests occur in the coercive community. However, the accumulation process miti-
gates the problem of con°icting interests because individual wealth levels converge. Specif-
ically, there is a maximal steady state wealth level which is attained aymptotically by all
individuals if they unanimously locate in the taxation community. But with identical wealth
levels, all individuals' preferences over tax rates coincide, and so unanimous location in the
taxation community comes to Pareto dominate location in the voluntary one. Despite this,
unanimous location in the voluntary community often remains a Nash equilibrium in the
static game | a potential coordination failure. The dynamics overcome this pitfall because
decisions are sequential rather than synchronous. In the model, no two individuals can per-
fectly coordinate the timing of their actions. With asynchronously repeated decisions, if
everyone locates in the community with involuntary provision, then no one wishes to be the
¯rst to depart. Yet, if from that point onward no one leave this community, then su±ciently
patient individuals will sequentially move there, anticipating that unanimous location in the
involuntary provision community is an \absorbing state" (backward induction). Unlike the
behavior, Markovian or otherwise, in standard repeated/dynamic games, an individual will
not choose an inferior location simply because he expects that others will do the same.
We caution that the analysis is not intended to suggest that migration is exclusively or
even primarily driven by public goods provision. Rather it is meant to demonstrate how
migration clearly exposes strengths and weaknesses in each of the mechanisms. Migration
weakens support for the voting mechanism when there are widely varying preferences over
the appropriate tax rate. Migration weakens support for the voluntary mechanism when the
free rider problem is most intense. Changing wealth distribution alters the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each mechanism. In Section 5 we discuss related literature. Finally,
Section 6 contains an Appendix with the proofs of the main results.
42 The Model
There is a ¯nite number of individuals denoted by the set I = f1;:::ng. Individual i 2 I
is distinguished by a wealth endowment z . The individuals are ordered so that z < z < i 1 2
P
¢¢¢ < z . The aggregate income is given by Z = z . The vector of wealth levels, in n i i2I
ascending order is given by z = (z ;:::;z ). 1 n
Each individual consumes two goods. One of the goods is private or \fully rivalrous."
The other is a local public good. An individual i's preferences are given by u(z ¡ y ;G) i i
where G is the quantity of the public good produced, and y is the amount of the voluntary i
contribution to the public good from individual i. The utility function u is assumed to be
strictly increasing and concave.
There are two communities, C and D, in which individuals in this society can reside.
In community D the public good is produced with voluntary contributions from the mem-
bership. In community C the good is provided by a simple proportional tax on wealth
determined by a majority vote. These mechanisms are de¯ned formally below. For each
community let I µ I denote the set of individuals located in k = C;D. For each k = C;D, k
P
aggregate income is given by Z = z , and the aggregate contributions in k are given k i i2Ik P
by Y = y . k i i2Ik
In each community the public good G is produced according to technology G = k k
F(Y ;jI j) where jI j is the number of citizens in location k. We allow for the possibil- k k k
ity that the good is not completely non-rivalrous. Congestion may diminish the amount of
public good available for consumption. Speci¯cally, we assume:
(A1) F is increasing and concave in Y ,
(A2) F is weakly decreasing in jI j, k
(A3) for each y > 0, F(my;m) is increasing in m.
The ¯rst assumption is standard. The second re°ects the potential for congestion. Larger
population sizes reduce output (e.g., ¯re protection is more costly to provide in larger cities).
The ¯nal assumption limits the extent of congestion. Proportional scaling up of the public
good still outweighs the e®ect of congestion. In particular, this assumption prevents the
public good from merely becoming a private good in large populations. Hence, we rule out
5the case of pure redistribution, i.e., G = Y=n since we wish maintain increasing returns from
having others in a community. A special case that conforms to our assumptions is the case
of a pure public good, i.e., G = F(Y;n) = F(Y;m) for all m;n.
The voluntary and involuntary provision mechanisms are formally speci¯ed as follows. In
the location D all decisions are completely decentralized and made privately and voluntarily.
P
Each individual jointly consumes G = F( y ;jI j) where y is i's voluntary contri- D i D i i2ID
bution. The second location is assumed to allocate the public good via majority rule. We
assume that a uniform tax rate, ¿, is levied in community C and determined by a majority
vote. Each individual i 2 I pays y = ¿z and jointly consumes G = F(¿Z ;jI j). Clearly, C i i C C C
the restriction to these two mechanisms puts us in a \second best" world. Still, they are
both commonly observed in local public goods provision. Examples include neighborhood
watch groups versus police protection, and voluntary versus municipal ¯re departments, and
charitable versus city-run homeless shelters. While these \mechanisms" often coexist, we
focus attention on the polar case in which only or the other is used in a community.
We assume that each individual may choose which community to join. This decision,
when aggregated with other individuals' choices of which community join, ultimately deter-
mines whether one or the other or both provision mechanisms survive. The location decision
of individual i is given by s 2 fD;Cg. The location pro¯le s is de¯ned by s = (s ;:::s ) i 1 n
with sn^ s ´ ((s ) ; ^ s ). De¯ne the indirect utility ¹ u of a location pro¯le s given wealth i j j6 =i i
pro¯le z by
8
X > > > > V (s;z) ´ maxu (z ¡ y ;F( y ;jI j) ) if s = D i i i i j D i < y ·z i i j2ID ¹ u (s;z) = (1) i > > > > : W (s;z) ´ u ((1 ¡ ¿(z;s))z ;F(¿(z;s)Z ;jI j) ) if s = C i i i C C i
where ¿(s;z) is the tax rate which is most preferred by the median voter or, more precisely,
the voter with the median income in C. The tax rate ¿(s;z) is the rate which would be
chosen by majority rule. Strict concavity of u and continuity of u in ¿ guarantee that each
individual has a unique most preferred tax rate and all preferences over tax rates are single
peaked. A standard result by Black guarantees that with single peaked preferences over
tax rates a majority voting outcome has a solution | the median type's most preferred tax
rate. Monotonicity in wealth of the most preferred tax rate ensures that the person with
the median wealth is the median voter. Functions V and W denote the indirect utilities of
consumption in voluntary and involuntary communities, resp.
6A (static) Nash equilibrium in locations is a location pro¯le s such that
W (s;z) ¸ V (snD;z); 8i 2 I : (2) i i C
and
V (s;z) ¸ W (snC;z); 8i 2 I : (3) i i D
7 Generally, Nash equilibria in locations need not exist. However, if congestion is not exces-
sive, then there is always an equilibrium in which everyone locates in the voluntary region.
To see why, observe that unanimous location in D is an equilibrium if V (D;:::;D;z) ¸ i
W ((D;:::;D)nC;z). Given de¯nitions of V and W this becomes i
X
V (D;:::;D;z) = maxu(z ¡ y;F( y + y;n)) i j y
j6 =i (4)
> maxu(z ¡ y;F(y;1)) = maxu((1 ¡ ¿)z;F(¿z;1)) = W ((D;:::;D)nC;s ;z) i i y ¿
¤ Let y be the optimal contribution for the indivdual if he moves to C by himself. Let ¹ y be his
P ¤ voluntary constribution in D. One can verify that y + ¹ y ¸ y . Intuitively, the reason j j6 =i
is that since an individual can always replicate in community D the contribution which he
¤ would tax himself in C, the aggregate constributions Y in D must exceed y . Hence, if D
F(Y ;n) ¸ F(y;1) (i.e., if congestion is not excessive) then inequality (4) holds. One can D
easily verify that this equilibrium exists, for example, in the case of pure public goods, i.e.,
F(Y;n) = F(Y;m) for all m;n.
Homogeneous Individuals
An important special case is one in which the population is homogeneous: z = z = i j
z; 8i;j. In this case, the strategic environment reduces to a coordination game. A coordi-
nation game is a normal form game with possibly multiple, Pareto ranked equilibria, one of
which Pareto dominates every other payo® in the game. With a homogeneous population,
there is always an equilibrium in which all individuals locate in C. To see this observe
W (C;:::;C;z) = max u((1 ¡ ¿)z;F(¿Z ;n)) i ¿ n
(5)
> max u((1 ¡ ¿)z;F(¿z;1)) = max u(z ¡ y;F(y;1)) = V ((C;:::;C)nD;z) ¿ y i
where the inequality follows from assumption (A3). Clearly, in a homogeneous society, every
individual's preferred tax rate coincides with that of the median voter. Note that choosing
7We exclude mixed strategies.
7an optimal tax rate is equivalent to choosing a contribution simultaneously for all members
of society. It also turns out that the pro¯le (C;:::;C) is unanimously preferred to any other
pro¯le. To see why, notice that by (A3),
maxu((1 ¡¿)z;F(¿Z ;n)) > maxu((1 ¡ ¿)z;F(¿Z ;m)) (6) n m ¿ ¿
for any m < n, implying that unanimous location in C is preferable to joining a community
C with fewer members. Also,
maxu((1¡¿)z;F(¿Z ;n)) = maxu(z ¡y;F(ny;n)) > maxu(z ¡y;F((m¡1)¹ y + y;m)) n m ¿ y y
(7)
for any m · n and where ¹ y is the symmetric equilibrium contribution toward the public m
good when m identical individuals belong to community D. This condition states that unan-
imous location in C is unanimously preferred to any payo® from locating in D. Intuitively,
the reason is that the marginal e®ect of one's preferred contribution in C is multiplied n-fold.
This is not so in community D where a classic free rider problem exists.
Observe that the inequalities in (5)-(7) are strict. This is a crucial point because it means
that these properties hold if all indiviuduals' wealth levels are approximately identical. We
state this formally.
Proposition 1 There exists ² > 0 such that if jz ¡ z j < ² for all i;j 2 I, then (1) i j
unanimous location in C is a Nash equilibrium of the location game, and (2) unanimous
location in C Pareto dominates every other location pro¯le.
To summarize from prior analysis, if congestion is not excessive, then there are at most
two equilibria with homogeneous population. There is always where everyone locates in C.
If (4) holds then there is also an equilibrium in which everyone moves to D. The former
equilibrium Pareto dominates the latter.
3 A Dynamic Model
Here we consider a dynamic extension of the static analysis in which in¯nitely lived individu-
als may repeatedly revise their location decisions. Time is discrete and indexed t = 1;2;:::;.
All variables, i.e. z ;s , etc. now have a time subscript t. Let ¯ > 0 denote the com- i i
mon discount factor. We demonstrate how two key dynamic features, capital accumulation
8and sequential decision making, may systematically push society toward one or the other
communities.
Accumulation of Public Capital
Consider a capital accumulation technology available to each agent and for which y is it
an input. It is given by
z = h (z ;Y ) (8) it+1 i it kt
where k = D;C. In equation (8), z is the capital of individual i at time t. Here it is it
assumed that capital can be turned into contemporaneous wealth one for one, so that wealth
enters directly as an input. In this model Y may be interpreted as some type of aggregate tk
capital in community k so that it enters into both the accumulation technology and, as in
the static model, the production of the public good. As an example, infrastructure yields
utility directly but also enters as an input in investment technologies. Another example is
public education which generates a consumption externality and a®ects wealth creation in
the subsequent period. In either case, the public component to human capital accumulation
may or may not be large. A special case of (8) is one where z varies only with z and it+1 it
y . In such a case, there is no externality in capital accumulation. Our interest in the it
speci¯cation (8) is not the existence of growth, per se. Rather, it is in the way in which
growth asymptotically a®ects wealth distribution.
Let z denote the wealth pro¯le and s 2 fC;Dg the location choice of individual i at t it
time t. Then the wealth pro¯le of society evolves according to
z = h(z ;Y ) ´ (h (z ;Y ) ) t+1 t t i it t s i2I it
We consider accumulation technologies with a steady state wealth level. Speci¯cally,
we assume that within each community, ¯xing the population, incomes converge to some
common level. Many standard technologies have this property. One typical example is the
° ± Cobb Douglas technology z = z Y with ° + ± < 1. Notice that accumulation may it+1 it t sit
occur at di®erent rates across communities.
Finally, for simplicity we will restrict attention to economies with initial wealth hold-
8 ings that are lower than this steady state level. Let ¹ z denote the steady state wealth of
8The restriction on initial wealth holding may be relaxed with further assumptions on the technology.
See the discussion in Section 3.1.
9an individual when everyone locates in C. By assumption (A3) and Proposition 1, it is
straightforward to show that for any path s ; t = 0;1;:::; the corresponding wealth levels t
satisfy z · ¹ z for all i and all t. That is, the maximal Nash equilibrium accumulation occurs it
if everyone resides in community C.
Sequential Choice
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the pro¯le in which all individuals reside in D is Pareto
inferior to one in which all individuals reside in C if wealth inequality is su±ciently small.
Consequently, there is a possibility of a \coordination failure" as wealth accumulates. This
occurs in the Tiebout model because each player remains in an inferior location only because
he expects that all others will do the same. If all players move at once, no player can
unilaterally signal his intent to do otherwise. This problem persists if the dynamics are
modelled as an iterated stage game where each iteration has synchronized moves. Yet, it
seems at least as natural in this context that inertia in individuals' decision making breaks
up the simultaneity.
We examine a timing structure in which individuals make location decisions asynchronously.
We use the same structure as the oligoply models of Maskin and Tirole (1988a,b). They
consider a duopoly in which each ¯rm sets its capacity given the temporarily ¯xed capac-
9 ity set by its rival. Firms alternate in moves, and the Markov Perfect equilibria of the
repeated/dynamic game are studied. As with capacity decisions, location decisions often
entail some adjustment cost or lags. We therefore model individuals who move sequentially,
with one individual having the opportunity to change his action in a period. We order the
individuals 1;:::n (mod n) so that if individual j had a decision opportunity in period t
then individual j + 1 has a decision opportunity in period t + 1, and individual 1 has the
opportunity if j = n. This ordering need not coincide with the natural ordering in which
higher indices have higher wealth levels.
Naturally there are many possible models of asynchronous choice. Others include the
(stationary) stochastic move model in which each individual i has a move with probability
P
p where p = 1. The results do not appear to depend criticically on the precise details i j j
10 of the sequential move model. Finally, the timing structure is more general than it ¯rst
appears since the length of a period may be small. Indeed, our main result will be shown to
9For a study of a general family of repeated strategic settings with asynchronous choice see Laguno® and
Matsui (1997).
10We conjecture that the results hold for many other timing structures as well
10hold when, equivalently, individuals are su±ciently patient.
If the current location pro¯le at time t is s and if i has a move and chooses ^ s at time i
t + 1 then the new pro¯le becomes sn^ s . Inductively, we can de¯ne the path from an initial i
pro¯le s as sn^ s n^ s n^ s ¢¢¢. Given the ordering, s = s . i i+1 i+2 i+n i
Markovian Behavior
We examine Perfect equilibria in which individuals' strategies are Markovian. A strategy
for an individual is a Markovian strategy if it varies only across states that are payo® relevent.
In this context this also means that behavior does not treat unequally individuals who are
otherwise equal. Formally, a Markovian strategy for i is a function f : (s;z) 7 ! ^ s . We will i i
limit the analysis to Markovian strategies which satisfy these properties:
11 (B1) For each s and i, f (s;z) is continuous in z almost everywhere. i
0 0 (B2) For any pair i;j 2 I, consider any pair of states (s;z) and (s;z ) such that z = z and i j
0 0 z = z (z and z permute i and j's wealth) and which are otherwise identical. Then j i
0 f (s;z) = f (s;z ). i j
Since location decisions are discrete, assumption (B1) implies that for almost every z there is
a neighborhood of z such that f (s; ^ z) = f (s;z) for all ^ z in that neighborhood. In particular, i i
this means that f is locally constant near the limit of the accumulation process. Assumption i
(B2) is an asymptotic symmetry condition. It implies that any two individuals who are
otherwise identical and face the same state choose the same strategy. This assumption is
vacuous along the accumulation path since individuals are generally endowed with di®erent
incomes except in the limit. Together, however, they imply symmetric behavior in a small
12 neighborhood of the limit.
As in single agent dynamic programming problems, there is a tractable recursive formu-
lation for the utility of an agent in the dynamic game. Recall that ¹ u (s;z) denotes the per i
0 period utility of the location pro¯le s given income distribution z. De¯ne U ( f j s;z;j ) i
to be the value to individual i of the pro¯le of Markovian strategies f = (f ) , given the j j2I
current location pro¯le s, the current income pro¯le z, and the current mover j 2 I. U has i
11Here, \almost everywhere" means \except on a set of Lebesgue measure zero."
12Additionally, the assumptions help to ensure that dynamic behavior does not depend crucially on the
particular order of the sequential decisions.
11the recursive representation,
U (f j s;z;j) = (1 ¡ ¯)¹ u (s;z) + ¯ U (f j ;snf ;h(z;Y );j + 1) (9) i i i j+1
where payo®s are normalized by multiplying through by (1 ¡ ¯). A Markov Perfect equilib-
^ rium (MPE) is a a tuple f = (f ) such that for any (possibly non-Markovian) strategy f , j i
for all s, all z, and all j 2 I.
^ U (f j s;z;j) ¸ U (fnf j s;z;j): i i i
It is assumed here that dynamic choices are limited to location, rather than location
and public contributions. The reason is that in a su±ciently large society, individuals may
reasonably neglect the strategic e®ect of their own contribution/voting decisions on others.
There is little to be gained by choosing a contribution or vote that does not maximize one's
temporary period payo®. By contrast, location decisions do have long term consequences
since one's own locational decision may be ¯xed for some time. Hence, one's optimal location
depends on the long term forecast of where he thinks others will be, instead of where they
13 currently reside.
3.1 Main Result: Public Provision Survives Uniquely
Our main result states that for any initial state, if individuals are su±ciently patient then
they all eventually reside in the C location permanently. That is, only involuntary provision
is viable in the long run. What is surprising about this result is that, unlike in the standard
repeated game setup, certain static equilibria cannot arise here as Markov Perfect equilibria.
One notable pro¯le which does not arise is one in which all individuals remain permanently
in D. This is due primarily to the asynchronicity by which location decisions are made.
The result is broken into two Propositions. The ¯rst states that, independently of the
discount factor, if incomes are close enough to their steady state levels, then if all individuals
have unanimously reached the public provision region C, no one ever departs thereafter.
13A further problem with assuming that contribution and voting decisions are long run is technical. While
aggregation via majority vote as speci¯ed here is standard in the literature, the explicit process by which
individuals actually vote is not formally de¯ned. Hence it is not a formally de¯ned game. Presumably, the
choice of tax rate is one that would survive a majority vote against any alternative. However, the process
by which alternative tax rates \arrive" or are placed on the agenda is often not modelled. Neither do we
model it here.
12Proposition 2 Let f be any Markov Perfect equilibrium satisfying (B1) and (B2). Then
¹ ¹ ¹ there is a ² > 0 and a neighborhood, N (z) of z, such that for all i and all z 2 N (z), ² ²
f (C;:::;C;z) = C. i
The second part of the result asserts that, starting from any pro¯le, unanimous location
in C is reached eventually if individuals are patient enough.
¹ ¹ Proposition 3 There is a ¯ such that for all ¯ ¸ ¯, for any Markov Perfect equilibrium f
¹ ¹ satisfying (B1) and (B2), there exists a time t such that s = (C;:::;C) for all t ¸ t. t
The Logic of the Result
The proofs are in the Appendix, but the basic idea behind the two results is not compli-
cated. Beginning with Proposition 1, if incomes have approximately converged then there
are at most two static Nash equilibria of the stage game in each period. In one, everyone lo-
cates in C, in the other all locate in D. The former Pareto dominates the latter. Since choice
is sequential, someone must unilaterally initiate a departure from C. But since C is Pareto
dominant, the individual must expect that su±ciently many others will follow his move to D
thereafter. More than half of society must depart in order for him to bene¯t from a move to
D. Therefore, more than n=2 periods must pass before his departure is bene¯cial. Since, the
individual has a decision opportunity every n periods he would always prefer to wait until
the others have already departed. However, if everyone waits for everyone else to depart,
then no one leaves. Hence, departure from C is not consistent with Markov Perfection.
The role of sequential choice in this logic is clear. Since the free rider problem is solved
in community C, even under the \worst" expectation it is preferable to wait until others
have moved sequentially to the voluntary community. Note that the symmetry assumption
prevents the model from being overly sensitive to the order of moves when a neighborhood of
the steady state is reached. However, it is easy to construction symmetric equilibria in which
14 individuals depart from community C if play is either nonsequential or non-Markovian.
The idea of Proposition 2 is that if individuals are patient enough, then the waiting cost
of reaching C is negligible. The logic utilizes a standard backward induction argument: if i
14If choices are not sequential, then Pareto inferior static equilibria are always equilibria of the in¯nite
game even with the Markovian restriction. If behavior is not Markovian, then Folk Theorems exist even in
(generic) sequential games (see Dutta (1995)).
13is the only one who is not in C then he moves there; if i and j are the only ones who have
not moved to C then i moves there knowing then that j will move there, etc. An individual
may therefore move to a small community if he expects others to follow. Hence, transitions
from inferior static equilibria must occur. Note that the backward induction argument may
break down if initial wealth holdings lie above the steady state. In such a case, if this steady
state is not the global optimum, there may be incentives for wealthy individuals to \delay"
15 the transition inde¯nitely by remaining in the voluntary community D. The logic is not
unlike results of Rubinstein and Wolinski (1994) and Laguno® and Matsui (1997) who prove
\anti-Folk Theorems" in repeated pure coordination games with asynchronous choice.
Nonconvergence
If the accumulation technology does not converge globally, then the result need not hold.
The intuition is this: if wealth levels of di®erent individuals do not converge then con°icting
interests persist. The Pareto advantage of living with involuntary provision is no longer
inevitable. Hence, despite the ever present free rider problems in the voluntary community,
some might prefer D to an undesirable tax rate in C. This gives voluntary provision the
base of support it lacked under convergence.
Generally, the wealthiest individual z is the most likely to prefer to remain in D even n
if it means locating there by himself. A su±cient condition for community D to maintain
a population is that individual n will never prefer to leave D in any equilibrium scenario.
If this were not the case, then one could always contruct a MPE in which individual n
rationally anticipates the scenario in which he is better o® in C. A su±cient condition holds
if for all t, for all s with s = C, n
V (snD;z ) > W (s;z ) (10) n t n t
If D is to be more than just a Robinson Crusoe community, it su±ces that individual n¡1,
the next wealthiest member, never prefers to leave D given that individual n always remains
in D. If this holds, then it su±ces for individual n ¡ 2 to prefer to remain in D given that
individuals n;n¡1 remain in D, and so forth... This kind of locational cascade is su±cient
for community D to survive uniquely.
However, such a cascade could not exist without su±cient wealth dispersion. To see this,
15This delay might be ruled out if the technology satis¯es decreasing returns to scale everywhere, as in
the Cobb Douglas example with ° + ± < 1. We conjecture then that the argument will work for any initial
wealth pro¯le. However, the proof would be considerably more complicated.
14observe that Inequality (10) can be rewritten as
maxu((1 ¡ ¿)z ;F(¿z ; 1) ) > u((1 ¡ ¿(s;z )z ;F(¿(s;z )z + ¿(s;z )(Z ¡ z ); n) ) nt nt t nt t nt t t nt ¿
Note that in the left side of the inequality, a lone individual's choice of tax rate imposed
upon himself is equivalent to his choice of contribution. Putting aside congestion issues, this
inequality can only hold if individual n prefers his own tax rate to that of community C even
if the tax base in D consists only of his own income. This requires that his preferred tax rate
¿ is far from ¿(s;z ), and/or that Z ¡ z is small. In either case, he must be su±ciently t t nt
wealthier than everyone else.
Hence, for the locational cascade to hold requires that each individual i be su±ciently
wealthier than 1;2;:::;i¡1. Of course, the resulting wealth pro¯le would be extreme. Less
extreme, however, is the possibility that voluntary provision can be supported by a small
but wealthy elite. Such support could perpetuate if accumulation follows a balanced growth
path which maintains the wealth inequality.
4 Some Examples
The ¯rst examples relating wealth/income inequality to voluntary and involuntary provi-
sion of a public good come from education. James (1993) assembles data on the fraction
of private school enrollments in elementary and secondary levels for 40 countries. At the
secondary level, for instance, this fraction varies between 1% and 89%. Regressing these
private enrollments on the fraction of incomes accruing to the bottom decile yields negative
coe±cients, i.e, higher equality is associated with smaller private school enrollments (with
t-statistic around -1.4). We ran this regression twice, once for elementary level and once for
secondary level education. These results are robust to inclusion of GDP as a right hand side
variable.
From the Digest of Education Statistics we obtain the fraction of students in the 50 states
enrolled in private school in the U.S. Braun (1988) calculates Gini coe±cients for family
income distribution. Regressing private enrollments on these Gini coe±cients yields positive
regression coe±cients (with t-statistics of 1.3). Again, higher inequality is associated with
higher private enrollments. Similar results are obtained by Hamilton and Macauley (1991)
16 and Schmidt (1992).
16There are other potential explanations for the correlation between inequality and private provision. In
15Note that the data is cross-sectional, and so there is no associated time series on mi-
gration or explicit evolution of wealth inequality. Nevertheless, as stylized facts they are
consistent with the theory: low inequality is associated with public provision. There are
conceptual issues as well. First, in many instances taxation for schooling cannot be avoided.
In particular, a family whose child attends a private school usually cannot opt out of the
state's taxation system. Yet, the inability to opt out of public school taxation mitigates,
but does not invalidate the logic of how location determines the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of the two institutions. Indeed, voluntary provision becomes even less desirable if one
must also pay taxes. It is worth noting, moreover, that a few states in the U.S., notably
Wisconsin, o®er tuition tax credits for private enrollees. This amounts to a limited option
to exit the cumpulsory system. Current policy debates on education have often focussed on
expanding these tax breaks at a federal level. The present model becomes a useful analytical
tool for evaluating these proposals.
Second, private schooling is not the same as voluntary provision. Education is certainly
not a pure public good. Tuition payments confer substantial private returns. On the other
hand, many economists believe that there are substantial external returns with education
which, in turn, create classic free rider problems associated with voluntary provision. Accord-
ing to Friedman (1962), \the gain from the education of a child accrues not only to the child
or his parents, but also to other members of society. The education of my child contributes
to your welfare by promoting a stable, democratic society. It is not feasible to identify the
17 particular individuals (or families) bene¯tted, and so charge for services rendered" (p.86).
The logic of the argument is more powerful at the local level since one's education ar-
guably has greater e®ect on those in greater proximity, particularly within the school itself.
Weisbrod (1962) argues that external e®ects associated with education accrue at the local
level: education a®ects one's neighbors \by inculcating acceptable social values and behavior
norms in the community children." Furthermore, education bene¯ts neighbors by lowering
crime and thus law enforcement costs. Haveman and Wolf (1984) establish a taxonomy of
non-market e®ects of education. They include crime reduction and social cohesion as local
externalities. In empirical work, Henderson, Mieszkowski, and Sauvageau (1978), Link and
Mulligan (1991), and Summers and Wolf (1977) ¯nd externalities which operate within the
models of public provision of goods in which there is a private alternative within the same jurisdiction such
as the models of Hamilton and Macauley (1991), Epple and Romano (1996), and Glomm and Ravikumar
(1998), higher inequality implies a thicker upper tail of the income distribution. The thicker upper tail
implies, in turn, that more people choose the private alternative over the compulsory one.
17Weisbrod (1962) and Cohn and Geske (1990) make similar arguments.
16classrom, while Brown and Saks (1975) ¯nd externalities within the school district.
Clearly, the model, unlike contemporary data, assumes that a single type of institution
exists in any community. There are good tractability reasons for the assumption. Existence
problems are known to arise for equilibria in majority voting problems when voluntary
alternatives to public provision exist (see, for example, Stiglitz (1974)). Nevertheless, the
assumption is restrictive since no such strict separation typically exists in contemporary
communities. The same community that uses tax revenue to build roads and fund a police
force relies on charitable donations to fund public monuments and the community orchestra.
For this reason, it easier to ¯nd historically older examples that conform more closely
and neatly to the two mechanism scenario in the model. For example, Eby (1952) reports
that English migration to Dutch schools took place in the 17th century took place largely
because Dutch schools were ¯nanced via compulsory taxation by the municipalities. At the
same time, in England the Poor Law of 1601 declared that education was a charity and not
a right. Isaac (1982) documents in 18th century migration in Colonial Virginia from the
established Church of England to the new Babtist Church. The former relied on voluntary
contributions from its membership, while the latter required unanimity and later by majority
voting.
We do not have data for the relevant time periods in these cases to determine whether
increasing equality drove the relocations. On the other hand the nature of the status quos
in each instance suggests that large, favorable transformations in wealth distribution took
place along side these relocations. In England, the emergence of a merchant middle class
during this time is well documented. In Colonial America, Isaac (1982) notes that the new
migrants were increasingly wealthy common farmers, seeking escape from the gentry-driven
voluntarism of the established Church of England (p.164).
5 Summary and Related Literature
There is an established literature which has examined various types of provision procedures
for public goods in isolation from other procedures. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986),
for instance, examine private provision of a public good. They provide a fairly complete
characterization that may be compared directly with established results on public provision
via majority voting which can sometimes be shown to supply public goods e±ciently (see
17Bergstrom (1979)). An early seminal contribution from this literature which examines
explicitly the trade o® between problems of con°icting interests and the problems of free
riding in public goods provision is Buchanon and Tullock (1962). They derive the optimal
voting rule as one that balances these two incentive problems. By way of comparison, the
present contribution allows the participants themselves to make personal decisions between
the mechanisms based on this trade o®.
On this score, a large literature has emerged which concerns the link between Tiebout-
style locational choice and policy outcomes. For example, Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984),
Epple and Romer (1992), Fernandez and Rogerson (1994, 1996) study redistributive poli-
cies as a consequence of voting and migration. Bearse (1994) studies location of criminal
activity as a consequence of law enforcement activity. De Bartolome (1990), and Oates and
Schwab (1991) examine the e®ects of peer groups and neighborhood composition on loca-
tional choices. While the aformentioned papers are static, Benabou (1993,1996a, 1996b)
and Durlauf (1996) examine dynamic multi-jurisdictional models. The former studies the
determinants and consequences of segregation, while the latter shows that wealth inequality
causes poverty traps.
All these papers assume a coercive mechanism which is homogeneous across communities.
They all address the question: what is the in°uence of the mechanism on migration and the
evolution of the wealth distribution? The present paper di®ers from these by taking this
evoluton as, in a sense, given and asks how migration and the evolution of wealth inequality
in°uences the spatial selection of mechanisms.
More recently, Tiebout-style locational choice has been applied to spatial selection of
social choice mechanisms. An example is Caplin and Nalebu® (1992, 1997). They examine
existence issues in a rich class of static models in which communities may be di®erentiated by
the social welfare function used to determine policy outcomes. They examine the potential
for communities to respond to migrational pressure by changing their aggregation rule.
The only two papers that we are aware of in which migration occurs over real time to
determine viability of social choice procedures are Kollman, Miller and Page (KMP) (1997)
and Laguno® (1997). The ¯rst studies a computational model in which boundedly rational
agents can move between locations di®erentiated by voting procedures that determine an
abstract social choice outcome. The latter uses evolutionary game theoretic tools to consider
Tiebout choice between public and private provision of a public project. The main di®erence
between these two papers and the present one is that the present one considers a standard
18equilibrium analysis in a neoclassical environment for public goods provision. Here, fully
optimizing agents face a concave production technology for a public good.
Yet, the present model is far from de¯nitive. It only suggests some of the di®erences
between long run viability of voluntary and involuntary provision. Many issues have yet to
be examined. For example, the dynamic model should be generalized eventually to consider
many communities and many di®erent provision mechanisms. The di±culty of such a model
is that complicated locational cycles are likely to appear even between communities o®ering
the same voting procedure. Ultimately, a computational route such as the one taken by
KMP may be the most fruitful for the more general setup.
Another important missing element is the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. In the model
with convergence, the presence of shocks slows, and may well stop the asymptotic out-
migration from the voluntary provision community. The latter could occur if the magnitude
of the shocks is large and the variability is stationary. In that case individuals with perfect
foresight choose to remain in the voluntary community since the expected distance between
18 their ideal contribution and that of the median voter is large.
In order for stochastic versions of Propositions 2 and 3 to hold, the shocks must be small
and su±ciently infrequent. In that case, N (¹ z) de¯nes a basin of attraction in community C ²
from which no individual, in the absence of an income shock, would depart. The potential
problem comes from the backward induction logic if a number of individuals realize similar
shocks to wealth that put them above the steady state before they move. These individuals
may have incentives to remain permanently in D unless the new steady state reached in
community D eventually falls below ¹ z.
Finally, our comparison has been limited to provision of public goods so far. When
provision of private goods is the issue, the bene¯t of overcoming the free rider problem
19 dissipates, and so involuntary provision is more di±cult to support.
6 Appendix
For all the results in this Appendix, we ¯x a Markov Perfect equilibrium f satisfying
18We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.




¤ (B1) and (B2). Then we let s = (C;:::C) denote the location pro¯le in which everyone
¤ ¤ locates in C. That is, s satis¯es s = C for all i. i
The proof of Proposition 2 will utilize the following four lemmata.
Lemma 1 Suppose that z = ¹ z. Then f = f for each i;j whenever s = s and f varies i j ¡i ¡j i
only over jI j, the number of individuals in C C
Proof: The fact that f = f for each i;j clearly follows from the symmetry assumption, i j
(B2). Moreover, since the Markovian restriction implies that f varies only over payo® i
relevant information, f varies only over jI j, the number of individuals in C (clearly, jI j i C D
can be inferred from jI j). 2 C
¤ ¹ The next Lemma asserts that W (s ;z) is the uniquely globally maximal stage game i
payo® of the dynamic game.
¤ ¹ Lemma 2 For all i, W (s ;z) > ¹ u (s;z) for each s and each z. i i
Proof Recall that ¹ u describes generally the stage game payo® in the dynamic game. By i
¤ Proposition 1, W (s ; ¹ z) > ¹ u (s; ¹ z) for all s. Now by assumption (A3), and the assumption i i
¤ that given to the steady state ¹ z in location pro¯le s , it follows that ¹ z ¸ z for each i and it
¹ ¹ each t. Since every individual has wealth ¹ z in the distribution z, we therefore have ¹ u (s;z) ¸ i
¤ ¹ ¹ ¹ u (s;z) for all z and s. To summarize, we have shown W (s ;z) > ¹ u (s;z) ¸ ¹ u (s;z) for all i i i i
z and s. 2
The next Lemma asserts that in ¹ z, every mover is better o® for n periods by remaining
¤ in s even if every subsequent mover moves to D.
¤ ¹ Lemma 3 Suppose that z = z. Suppose that the current pro¯le is s , and the current mover
¤ ¤ is i. Then, for any subsequent path s ns n¢¢¢ns from s , we have i+1 i+n¡1
n¡1 n¡1 X X
t ¤ t ¤ ¹ ¹ ¯ W (s nCn¢¢¢ns ;z) > ¯ V (s nDn¢¢¢ns ;z) i i+t i i+t
t=0 t=0
Proof. Recall from Proposition 1 that unanimous location in C under ¹ z is a globally
dominant payo®. Observe that the worst n-period payo® to i if he remains in C is obtained
20n¡1 if all subsequent n ¡ 1 individuals choose D. Hence, for any sequence fs g with s = C, t 0 t=0
t
n¡1 n¡1 z }| { X X
t ¤ t ¹ ¹ ¯ W (s nCn¢¢¢ns ;z) ¸ ¯ W (CnDn¢¢¢nD;z) (11) i i+t i
t=0 t=0
On the other hand, the best n-period payo® to i if he moves to D is obtained if all subsequent
n¡1 n ¡ 1 individuals also choose D. Hence, for any sequence fs g with s = D, t 0 t=0
t
n¡1 n¡1 z }| { X X
t ¤ t ¯ V (s nDn¢¢¢ns ; ¹ z) · ¯ V (DnDn¢¢¢nD; ¹ z) (12) i i+t i
t=0 t=0
It su±ces to show
2 3
t t




¹ To simplify notation, let us write W (CnDn¢¢¢nD;z) ´ W(Infi + 1;:::;i + tg) where i
Infi + 1;:::;i + tg is the set of individuals remaining in C. Similarly, we write
t
z }| {
¹ V (DnDn¢¢¢nD;z) ´ V (fi;i + 1;:::;i + tg) where fi;i + 1;:::;i + tg is the set of people i
who choose D.
Observe ¯rst that more than n=2 individuals must have left C before jI j > jI j. In D C
0 0 0 addition, W(I ) > V(I ) for any subcollection I µ I of society. Therefore, the only time
periods for which W(I ) < V(I ) is possible are the last n=2 periods which are discounted C D
0 00 0 00 more heavily than the ¯rst n=2 periods. Finally, observe that W(I )¡V(I ) > V(I )¡W(I )
0 00 0 00 for any two disjoint collections I ;I with I [ I = I. To verify this, one need only collect
W terms on one side of the inequality and V terms on the other. Pareto dominance of C
over D for equal populations then ¯nishes the job. Putting these facts together, observe
then that for each di®erence W(Infi + 1;:::;i + tg) ¡ V (fi;i + 1;:::;i + tg) in the sum in
(13) there is a symmetric di®erence V(fi;i+ 1;:::;i+n¡tg) ¡W(Infi+1;:::;i+n¡tg)
in the sum. Rather, each depends only on the cardinality of the sets I and I . Hence we D C
have that
W(Inf;i + 1;:::;i + tg) ¡ V(fi;i + 1;:::;i + tg) > 0
whenever t · n=2 and for any t = 1;:::n,
W(Infi + 1;:::;i + tg) ¡ V(fi;i + 1;:::;i + tg)
(14)
> V(fi;i + 1;:::;i + n ¡tg) ¡ W(Infi + 1;:::;i + n ¡ tg):
210 00 0 00 Inequality (14) comes from the symmetric inequality W(z;I )¡V(z;I ) > V(z;I )¡W(z;I )
proved above. From these last two inequalities, we conclude that the sum in the right side
of (13) is strictly positive. Hence the Lemma is proved. 2
The next Lemma asserts that i's n-period forward continuation payo® from choosing
location C is no worse than if he had chosen D.
¤ n n ¹ Lemma 4 Let s be the location pro¯le and suppose that z = z. Let snCnf and snDnf
¤ denote the n period equilibrium paths from s when the current mover chooses either C or
D, respectively. Then
¤ n ¤ n ¹ ¹ U (fj s nCnf ;z;i) ¸ U (fj s nDnf ;z;i): i i
¤ Proof: Suppose ¯rst that the next mover, i + 1, chooses f (s nC) = C. Then, by Lemma i+1
¤ ¤ 1, each subsequent j also chooses C when faced with pro¯le s , and so s is an absorbing
state. In this case, the Lemma follows from Lemma 2.
¤ D C Suppose then that f (s nC) = D. Let s (resp. s ) denote the n-period forward i+1 i i
location chosen taken by i in period t + n when i chooses location D (resp. location C)
currently. The two alternative scenarios are
q
z }| {




¤ D s nDn:::nDn:::nsi
D Now observe that s = C cannot be a best response for i since some previous mover j chose i
location D when facing q ¡ 1 other members of D. By Lemma 1, it is therefore optimal for
mover i to make the same location decision.
D Hence, suppose s = D. Then i can do no worse by choosing C in period t, then choosing i
D in period t+n, since he then joins at least q, rather than q¡1 other citizens in community
¤ n¡1 D and, by (A3), production of the public good is higher. That is, U (fj s nCnf nD; ¹ z;i) ¸ i
¤ n¡1 ¹ U (fj s nDnf nD;z;i). Again the conclusion follows. 2 i
22Proof of Proposition 2 Putting Lemmas 2-4 together, observe that at each time t,
t+n¡1 X
¿¡t n ¤ n ¤ U (fj s nC; ¹ z;i) = (1 ¡ ¯)¯ W (f(s ; ¹ z); ¹ z) + ¯ U (fj s nCnf ; ¹ z;i) i i t¡1 i
¿=t (15) t+n¡1 X
¿¡t n ¤ n ¤ ¹ ¹ ¹ ¹ > (1 ¡ ¯)¯ V (f(s ;z);z) + ¯ U (fj s nDnf ;z;i) = U (fj s nD;z;i): i t¡1 i i
¿=t
¤ ¹ Therefore, at pro¯le z, remaining in s is a sequential best response for every individual.
¹ ¹ By assumption (B1) there is some neighborhood of N (z) of z with ² > 0, such that ²
¹ all individuals' strategic behavior is constant over N (z). Hence, strategies only vary across ²
location pro¯les s. By the Convergence assumption, there is, for each location, some time
T such that if the pro¯le within the location has not changed for T periods, then incomes ² ²
¹ within the location are in neighborhood N (z). Moreover, by making ² small enough, by ²
Proposition 1 unanimous location in C gives a globally dominant payo®. Suppose then that
¤ s has been the current pro¯le for T periods. Since everyone resides in the same location, all ²
incomes are in N (¹ z). By continuity assumption (B1), (15) holds for all z in the neighborhood ²
¹ N (z). This concludes the proof. 2 2 ²
The next two lemmata will be utilized to prove Proposition 3.
¤ The next Lemma states that s is an absorbing location if individuals are patient enough.
¤ ¤ ¹ Lemma 5 Let (s ;z;j) be any state in which location pro¯le is s . Then there is a ¯ < 1
¤ ¤ ¹ such that if ¯ ¸ ¯ then f (s ;z) = s for all i. i i
Proof The proof involves a backward induction argument. Let ² > 0 denote the size of
¹ ¹ the neighborhood N (z) in which behavior coincides with that on z. By the convergence ²
¤ assumption, from any state (s ;z;j) there is some time T after which each individual i has ²
jz ¡ ¹ zj < ². To see why, observe that with a ¯nite number of individuals even the individual i
with the slowest accumulation eventually enters N (¹ z). Then, by Proposition 2, no individual ²
¤ leaves community C if s has occurred for T periods. As a normalization, let T coincide ² ²
with calendar time. We can also choose ² small enough so that, using the Lemma 2 there is
some ´ < ² such that
¤ W (s ;z ) > ¹ u (s;z) + ´ (16) j T j ²
¹ for all s and all z = 2 N (z). This implies ²
¤ ¤ W (s ;z ) > U (fj s nD;z ;j) + ´ (17) j T j T ² ²
23Hence, let ¯(T ) be large enough so that for all ¯ ¸ ¯(T ), ² ²
1 X
¤ t¡T ¤ ² (1 ¡ ¯)W (s ;z ) + ¯ (1 ¡ ¯)¯ W (s ;z ) j T ¡1 j t ²
t=T² (18)
¤ ¤ > (1 ¡ ¯)V (s nD;z ) + ¯U (fj s nDnf ;z ;j) j T j j+1 T +1 ² ²
But according to the inequality in (17), the choice s = C is a best response for individual j j
¤ at time t = T ¡ 1. Hence, if ¯ ¸ ¯(T ), then s is absorbing at time T ¡1. This argument ² ² ²
can now be repeated for time t = T ¡ 2: there is some discount factor ¯(T ¡ 1) > ¯(T ) ² ² ²
such that choosing community C is a best response at time T ¡ 2. To see this we need ²
only substitute z for z in the inequalities (16)-(18). Repeating this argument for each T ¡1 T ² ²
time t = 0;1;:::;T ¡ 1, we obtain a sequence ¯(1);¯(2);:::;¯(T ) of discount factors with ² ²
¤ ¤ ¯(1) > ¯(2) > ¢¢¢ > ¯(T ), so that if ¯ ¸ ¯(1), then f (s ;z ) = s is a best response for all ² j t j
¹ j. Letting ¯ = ¯(1), the proof is complete. 2
The last Lemma asserts that, starting from the initial period, su±ciently patient indi-
¤ viduals will move in sequence to community C, thereby reaching s after n periods.
^ Lemma 6 Let z denote the initial wealth endowment. Then there is a ¯ < 1 such that if 0
¤ ¤ ^ ¯ ¸ ¯ then f (s ;z ) = s for t = i = 1;:::;n. t t t
Proof As in the previous Lemma, we utilize a backward induction argument. Without loss
¤ of generality suppose that s(0) = (D;:::;D). Suppose that s(n) = s nD so that in period
n, all individuals except person n have located in community C. Let ¯(1);¯(2);:::;¯(T ) ²
be the sequence as constructed in the proof of Lemma 5. The logic of that Lemma easily
extends to person n: let ¯(0) > ¯(1) be such that for all ¯ ¸ ¯(0),
1 X
¤ t¡n¡1 ¤ (1 ¡ ¯)W (s ;z ) + ¯ (1 ¡ ¯)¯ W (s ;z ) j n j t
t=n+1 (19)
¤ ¤ > (1 ¡ ¯)V (s nD;z ) + ¯U (fj s nDnf ;z ;j) j n j j+1 n+1
and so person n's best response at time t = n is to choose s = C. n
To complete the induction step, suppose that individual k has a move at time k given a
pro¯le s(k) in which individuals i = 1;:::;k ¡1 successively chose community C in periods
1;:::k ¡ 1, and individuals i = k + 1;:::;n will choose C if person k does so. Let ¯k+1
24denote the requisite discount factor for individual k + 1. Then de¯ne ¯ > ¯ so that for k k+1
all ¯ ¸ ¯ , k
n¡1 1 X X
t¡k t¡n¡1 ¤ (1 ¡ ¯) ¯ W (s(t);z ) + ¯ (1 ¡¯)¯ W (s ;z ) j t j t
t=n+1 t=k (20)
> (1 ¡ ¯)V (s(k)nD;z ) + ¯U (fj s(k)nDnf ;z ;j) j k j k+1 k+1
Continuing this argument for all k, we obtain a sequence
¯ > ¯ > ¢¢¢ > ¯ ´ ¯(0) > ¯(1)¢¢¢ > ¯(T ) 1 2 n ²
¤ Hence, for all ¯ > ¯ , each individual moves in sequence to s starting from the initial mover. 1
^ Letting ¯ = ¯ , the proof is complete. 2 1
Proof of Proposition 3 Proposition 3 now follows directly from Lemmata 5-6. 2 2
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